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The History of Japanese Racism,
Japanese American Redress, and the
Dangers Associated with Government
Regulation of Hate Speech
by HIROSHI FUKURAI AND ALICE YANG*
Introduction
Japan has numerically small yet historically significant racial and ethnic
minority populations. These groups include indigenous Ainu people,
Ryukyuans, Koreans, Chinese, Burakumins, and newly arrived foreign
workers from around the globe, all of whom remain among Japan's
marginalized populations. Despite the fact that Japan's Constitution
prohibits discrimination because of "race, creed, sex, social status or family
origin,"' Japanese society has long tolerated hate speech and racial animosity
toward Japan's minority populations. In order to regulate hate speech,
Professor Craig Martin calls for greater government involvement in the
revision of Japan's hate speech laws to include more specific restrictions and
sanctions. This Article argues that "trusting" and empowering the
government to define hate speech can be potentially dangerous and may even
harm people's right to free speech, including criticisms of racialized
government policies.
This Article further argues that Japan's racism has deep historical roots
and traces the historical genealogy of Japan's racial hate against Asians and
other marginalized racial and ethnic minorities in Japan. After the Western
* Professor of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz; Associate
Professor of History, University of California, Santa Cruz. We thank Professor Setsuo Miyazawa
for organizing the symposium on Hate Speech Laws in Japan in Comparative Perspectives, on
September 22, 2017, at the UC Hastings College of the Law. Our appreciation is extended to
Professor Keith Hand, who also co-hosted the symposium and History Professor Alan Christy at
UCSC who read the draft and gave valuable suggestions for revisions.
1. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, ¶. 1 (Japan).
2. See Craig Martin, Striking the Right Balance: Hate Speech Laws in Japan, the United
States, and Canada, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455 (2018).
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concept of race was first introduced in Japan in the late nineteenth century,
state planners and political elites incorporated its concept to construct a set
of "racialized" ideologies to promote a new nation-state building project.
These manufactured ideologies included an imagined national unity based
on its divine cultural roots in the "three-thousand-year history" of the
imperial family, a myth of racial homogeneity of its national subject, and
claims of Japanese racial superiority over other Asian races. Japan's nation-
building project and efforts to strengthen the centralized authority of the
national government has led to a number of imperial projects including the
1868 annexation of Ezo or Hokkaido which had been the homeland of the
indigenous Ainu people and the forced amalgamation of the Ryukyu
Kingdom in Okinawa in 1879.3 The supposed supremacy of the "Japanese
race" was also propagated to justify and facilitate Japanese imperial ventures
in Asia, leading to the invasion and forced annexation of Taiwan in 1895,
South Sakhalin in 1905, Korea in 1910, and Manchuria in the northeastern
region of China in 1931. Japan's participation in the First World War and
the defeat of Germany also led to the mandate control of islands in the North
Pacific Ocean in 1919.4
The rhetoric of "Japanese supremacy" fused within nationalist agendas
was further amplified by state propaganda agencies and provided the
normative justification for Japan's aggressive colonial policies and brutal
rule over ethnic Asians in Japan and abroad. For example, the rumor of
Korean uprisings in the aftermath of the Kanto Great Earthquake led to the
killing of more than 6,000 ethnic Koreans by Japanese militias in Tokyo
metropolitan areas in 1923. The fusion of racism and sexism also led to the
systematic sexual enslavement of nearly 200,000 Asian women and the
establishment of comfort stations throughout Asia; the full-scale invasion of
China in 1937, including the killing of hundreds of thousands of Chinese
civilians such as women, children and babies during the Nanjing massacre;
the exploitation of Chinese, other Asians, and Allied POWs as laboratory
subjects in biochemical human experiments by Unit 731 military doctors; the
brutal suppression of indigenous resistance against the puppet state
Manchukuo in China; and the forced migration of Koreans, other Asians, and
3. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION (2d ed.1992). This Article
relies on the theory of racial formation advanced by sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant.
According to Omi and Winant, a racial project is part of sociopolitical processes in society that
"mediate between discursive or prepresentational means in which race is identified and signified
on one hand, and the institutional and organization forms in which is it routinized and standardized
on the other." Id. at 60. This Article examines the role of state elites and institutions in the
representation of the meaning of race in language, imaginary, and popular discourse and situates
Japan's racial project within the greater social structure and state-centered political programs.
4. MILTON W. MEYER, JAPAN: A CONCISE HISTORY 182-185 (2014).
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Allied POWs to work as slave laborers in Japan's coal mines, war factories,
agricultural fields of Manchuria, and other colonized regions throughout
Asia during the first half of the twentieth century.
Despite these war crimes and atrocities in Japan and Japanese occupied
areas, the Japanese government has never acknowledged the role of racism
or "Japanese supremacy" in justifying their imperial projects. In contrast,
after WWII, the German government accepted responsibility for the
Holocaust based on a racist doctrine that asserted the superiority of the Aryan
race over Jews, Roma, Slavs, and other so called "inferior" races, offering
apologies and compensation to victims. Additionally, in 1988, the U.S.
government acknowledged racial prejudice behind the policy of mass
removal and incarceration of more than one hundred thousand Americans of
Japanese ancestry during WWII. Decades of grassroots activism and
political lobbying finally convinced the U.S. government to recognize that
the wartime incarceration was motivated by racism rather than national
security. 5 The passage of the 1988 Civil Liberties Act required a formal
government apology, the payment of $20,000 compensation to each
surviving former victim, and the creation of an educational foundation.
This Article begins by critically examining the history of Japanese
racism in relation to Japan's imperial projection of racialized policies and
military ventures unleashed by Japanese government and propaganda
agencies. We then examine Japanese Americans' successful redress
movement in the U.S. and the lessons of this campaign for other victims of
racist government policies. Many lawsuits have been filed against the
Japanese government to demand both apologies and reparations. The
plaintiffs included Ainu people who were stripped of their land and subjected
to Japan's forced assimilation policies; 6 Korean victims and families whose
members were murdered by Japanese militias during the Great Kanto
5. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904, 50a U.S.C. § 1989b
et seq. (1988). The legislation acknowledged that mass removal and incarceration "were motivated
largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership." Id. The
legislation utilized the conclusions of The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians, which called for additional funding of "comparative studies of similar civil liberties
abuses . . . upon particular groups of racial prejudice embodied by Government action in times of
national stress." COlM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (1983). See also Chalmers Johnson,
Some Thoughts on the Nanjing Massacre, 7 JAPAN POL'Y RES. INST. 1 (2000).
6. GAVANMCCORMACK, THE EMPTINESS OF JAPANESE AFFLUENCE 201 (2001); see JOHN
BATCHELOR, THE AI OF JAPAN: THE RELIGION, SUPERSTITIONS, AND GENERAL HISTORY OF
THE HAIRY ABORIGINES OF JAPAN 26 (1892) (explaining Ainu people's history of grievances and
calls for compensation).
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Earthquake in 192 3;7 Okinawan civilians who were killed or forced to
commit suicide during the Battle of Okinawa in 1945;" and Burakumins who
have been long subjected to both corporate and governmental discrimination,
as well as other Asian victims of Japanese imperialism, including families
and/or victims of sexual enslavement, forced laborers, among many others.9
This Article also critically examines the possible dangers associated
with giving governments the authority and power to regulate the parameters
of hate speech and free speech. Professor Craig Martin's article assumes that
the Japanese government should act as a principal organ to regulate and
legislate hate speech.' 0 This Article argues that the governments in Japan
and the U.S. have often acted against the interests of racial and ethnic
minorities and that greater public debate and discussion is needed to examine
the potential ramifications of government regulation of hate speech that
might limit the freedom of speech, especially speech critical of the
government. This Article further argues that today's resurgence of racism
and racial prejudice against marginalized populations in Japan must be
understood within the context of the historical legacy of Japanese
governmental policies that propelled racialized nation-building and imperial
projects in both Japan and Asia in the late nineteenth century and the early
half of the twentieth century. This Article substantiates that the failure to
acknowledge the role of Japanese racism and the Japanese government's
refusal to accept Japanese war responsibilities may lie at the heart of today's
resurgence of racism and hate speeches against Japan's minority populations.
7. The families of Korean victims established an organization to demand the Japanese
government provide a formal apology and compensation. See Kanto Daishinsai no Chosenjin
Gyakusatu: Giseisha Izokukai ga Hossoku: Kankoku [Korean Massacre During the Great Kanto
Earthquake: The Bereaved Families Association Established in South Korea], YANHAP NEWS
AGENCY, Aug. 30, 2017.
8. Okinawasen Sosho: Genkoku ga Koso [Litigation of the Battle of Okinawa: Appeal by
the Plaintiffs], RYUKYU SHIMPO, Mar. 30, 2016.
9. See IAN NEARY, THE BURAKU ISSUE AND MODERN JAPAN: THE CAREER OF
MATSUMOTO JICHIRO 76-78 (2010) (discussing Burakumins' demand for redress/reparations for
systemic racism and discriminationby the Japanese government. Instead of demanding reparations
for all Burakumin populations, individual lawsuits targeted for specific apologies and
compensation have been more successful. For example, in the Takamatsu Case in 1933, two
Burakumin youths were convicted of kidnapping a non-Burakumin girl. She agreed to marry one
of them without being informed that he was a Burakumin member. Her father then accused them
of kidnapping and they were sent to prison. The Suiheisha, prior to today's Buraku Liberation
League, decided to launch a national campaign about the Takamatsu court decision, which
ultimately led to the forced retirement of the trial judge and the demotion of both the police chief
and lead prosecutor.)
10. Martin, supra note 2.
[Vol. 45:3536
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I. The Origin of Racial Rhetoric and Racist Narratives
Scientific evidence suggests that race is an artificial construct and does
not exist in nature." Social science research also argues that race is a
political and legal construction and serves an important organizing principle
of people' everyday experiences in society.1 2 Furthermore, ideologies of
race can force the identities of mass populations into a predetermined, fixed
mold of categories, thereby creating a system of racial hierarchy based on
socially constructed cognitive abilities and concepts such as intelligence,
creativity, aesthetics, and morality. 13 The fact that race is a social
construction also suggests that there are no universally fixed categories
and/or meanings of race. Specifically, researchers suggest that "racial
categories . . . [have been] created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed""
through social conditions in specific historical processes in order to
accommodate the institutional practices and everyday experiences that are
synchronized and intertwined around the changing definition and principle
of race in order to maintain the racial order.' 5 In the U.S., race became an
effective designator of sociopolitical and legal status to regulate and
determine one's access to scarce societal goods and resources such as
property, freedom, justice, and equality.
Today, America's resurgence of racist speech and open racism against
African Americans, Latinx, American Indians, Arab Americans, and
Muslims has been fostered by the greater visibility and assertiveness of white
supremacist movements led by white nationalists, neo-Nazis, Ku Klux Klan,
the so-called alt-right, and other religious and white extremist groups. 16
These racist attitudes and racial prejudice against minority populations have
deep historical roots in colonial North America where emergent
socioeconomic systems justified the subordination of racial and ethnic
minorities, such as Africans in slavery; 7 the colonization of Mesoamerica
11. See generally HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY Box:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION 20-59 (2003).
12. FUKURAI & KROOTH, supra note 11.
13. FUKURAI & KROOTH, supra note 11.
14. OMI & WINANT, supra note 3, at 56.
15. OMI & WINANT, supra note 3, at 56.
16. Jesse Singal, Undercover with the Alt-Right, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2017, https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/opinion/alt-right-white-supremacy-undercover.html; Matt Stevens,
White Nationalists Reappear in Charlottesville in Torch-Lit Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/us/richard-spencer-charlottesville.html.
17. WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, SLAVERY AND RACE IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 51
(1984); see EDWARD E. BAPTIST & STEPHANIE M.H. CAMP, NEW STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN SLAVERY (2006) (discussing more recent studies of the history of American slavery).
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and subordination of Mexicans in the aftermath of the 1846 U.S. invasion of
Mexico;"s the continued extermination of indigenous populations throughout
North America;1 9 and the postbellum "importation" of slave laborers from
Asia, including Chinese coolies to work in the construction of continental
railroads, shaft mining in the Midwest, and agricultural fields in the
Southwest. 20 Racial attitudes and stereotypes were often couched in
altruistic rhetoric to rationalize and justify the subordination of non-white
populations. Prominent American historian Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, for
instance, defended slavery in 1918 as a benevolent institution that white
Europeans created so that uncivilized naked savages from Africa could be
saved from a bitter pagan fate, in which they would be properly fed, clothed,
and sheltered in slavery.2 '
Japan also had a comparable history of creating a system of racial
supremacy and racial order to promote nation-state consolidation and
national unity. Claims of the supremacy of the Japanese race also justified
and facilitated Japan's imperial ventures in Asia in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. After Japan declared its independence in 1868,
state elites incorporated Western ideas of race in the late nineteenth century
and developed racial classifications to be applied to citizenship, conscription,
and family registries within the grand scheme of Japan's imperial military
design and the expansion of the Japanese sphere of influence in Asia.22
Rather than incorporating the Western concept of race and its racial
classification which was based on tenuous phrenological and phenotypical
differences, Japan's racial classification of group membership infused the
concept of race with that of ethnicity based on a common "blood," imagined
ancestry, and shared national identity.23 The emperor, as father of the nation
18. See generally JOSE ANGEL HERNANDEZ, MEXICAN AMERICAN COLONIZATION DURING
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2012).
19. JEFFREY OSTLER, GENOCIDE AND AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY, OXFORD RES. ENCYC.
OF AM. HISTORY (2015).
20. WILLIAM TRAVIS HANES & FRANK SANELLO, THE OPIUM WARS: THE ADDICTION OF
ONE EMPIRE AND THE CORRUPTION OF ANOTHER 164 (2004); NOAM CHOMSKY, HOPES AND
PROSPECTS 78 (2010) ("the pig trade brought kidnapped Chinese workers to the United States to
build railroad and perform other hard labor").
21. See ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1918).
22. TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA AND KAZUHIKO TOGO, EAST ASIA'S HAUNTED PRESENT:
HISTORICAL MEMORIES AND THE RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM 233 (2008) ("Racial superiority
was an overriding psychological motivation that governed Japanese conduct from the top policy-
makers down to the soldiers on the ground. Racism imparted an especially brutal character in
Japanese imperialism, unique even among imperialist powers.").
23. YUKO KAWAI, RACE AND RACISM IN MODERN EAST ASIA: VOL. II: INTERACTIONS,
NATIONALISM, GENDER AND LINEAGE 368-88 (2015).
[Vol. 45:35389
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and descendent of the Sun Goddess, was a key to the emergence of the idea
of the Japanese people as a single race unified by blood whose superiority
was manifested in the notion of an unbroken line of imperial rule from the
beginning of time to the present. The term "minzoku" represented race,
ethnic community, nation, or the combination of all of these distinct
dimensions, while the term "jinshu" also referred to skin color, physical
stature, hair texture, cranial structure, and other facial and physical
characteristics. 24 Both terms became overlapped in meaning, imbued with
an imagined ancestry and a distinct Japanese national identity and racial
politics, suggesting that race-ethnicity dynamics became "at the heart of the
struggle over how to represent the Japanese people and, consequently, the
nation itself." 25 Ethnic nationalism "began to take on a new significance in
Japan after the turn of the twentieth century, just as the concept of ethnic
nation (minzoku) entered Japanese political discourse."26
During this period of nation-state building at home and Japanese
colonial expansion and imperial ventures in Asia from 1868 through the
1940s, the Japanese government exploited the idea of racial homogeneity to
differentiate and identify ethnically marginalized populations such as
Okinawans, the Ainu, and other underrepresented populations, imposed
assimilation programs in language, culture, and religion, and forcefully
integrated them into the Japanese national agendas. 27 The ideological
emphasis on a single and pure Japanese race further consolidated the modem
nation-state and justified centralized state authority.
State elites also used imported concepts of race to situate a unique
Japanese race in the hierarchy of Asian races and propagated their racial
superiority over other races of people in the Asian peripheries. Japanese
colonial and territorial expansion in Asia brought struggles with the
indigenous populations of Taiwan, Korea, China, and Russia, and the
modernizing elites developed a system of racial classification and hierarchy,
24. KAWAL, supra note 23.
25. KevinM. Doak, Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,
22 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 77, 81 (1996).
26. Id.
27. See generally PATRICK HEINRICH, THE MAKING OF MONOLINGUAL JAPANESE:
LANGUAGE IDENTITY AND JAPANESE MODERNITY (2012).
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itizenship, language uniformity, and cultural identity in the colonial
territories of Taiwan,2 8 Korea,2 9 and Manchuria.3 0
But the advent of the Japanese empire presented a particular ideological
conundrum for the discourse on race and ethnicity in Japan. Emerging in a
place that had articulated its own intense modernization project as anti-
imperialist, the task of imperial ideology was to portray the expansionist
Japanese empire as "liberator." Japanese apologists for empire clung to the
idea of justifying the Japanese empire as a liberation of their Asian
"brothers" from Western imperialism. The notion of the common ancestry
(d6soron) of the Japanese people and their Asian neighbors, especially
Koreans, or the common cultural grounds (d6bunron) shared with Asian
societies, especially Chinese, was linked to a narrative of Japan as a kind of
melting pot of Asia, proposed most famously by Okakura Kakuzo in The
Ideals of the East in 1903.31 Posing Japan as occupying a unique position as
the place where all of Asian cultures and all Asian peoples merged gave
Japanese ideologues a formula for arguing why Japanese empire was not the
imposition of rule of one alien race over another while also giving agents of
Japanese empire a way to argue for their natural role as leaders. In other
words, Japanese imperial ideologues could argue for both "brotherhood" and
the "superiority" of Japanese. By using metaphors of the "family" that were
prevalent in Confucian philosophy, Japanese could argue that their Asian
neighbors owed them loyalty and obedience and this, in turn, could then
justify stiff regulations separating Japanese from their colonized subjects and
at times brutal enforcement of Japanese rule. While this discourse on
"brotherhood" and "mixed origins" dominated the early years of the empire,
advocates of a view of Japanese as "pure blood," uncontaminated by their
inferior Asian neighbors circulated as a minority view.
An ethnically distinguished national consciousness remained,
nonetheless, very strong in the domestic consolidation, colonial policies and
projections in Asia, and international relations with the West. As the crises
28. See generally PING-HUI LIAO AND DAVID DER-WEl WANG, TAIWAN UNDER JAPANESE
COLONIAL RULE, 1895-1945: HISTORY, CULTURE, MEMORY (2012).
29. MARK E. CAPRIO, JAPANESE ASSIMILATION POLICIES IN COLONIAL KOREA, 1910-1945
(2011).
30. See generally LOUISE YOUNG, JAPAN'S TOTAL EMPIRE MANCHURIA AND CULTURE OF
WARTIME IMPERIALISM (1999); see also Mariko Asano Tamanoi, Victims of Colonialism?
Japanese Agrarian Settlers in Manchukuo and Their Reparation, 7 ASIAN-PAC. J. 1 (2009)
(discussing the impact of imperial policies on Japanese settlers in Manchuria).
31. See generally OKAKURA KAKUZO, THE IDEALS OF THE EAST: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE ART OF JAPAN (1903); see generally OGUMA EIJI, A GENEALOGY OF 'JAPANESE' SELF-
IMAGES (2002).
[Vol. 45:3540
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in China intensified in the wake of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and
as the resistance of Koreans proved to be more durable than the
"brotherhood" ideologues had imagined, "pure blood" advocates began to
win the day. 32 As total war erupted in China in 1937 and war with the U.S.
began in 1941, Japanese racial discourse swung hard toward an articulation
of Japanese racial superiority based on the idea of Japanese purity.33 During
WWII, Japanese racial politics aligned with German racial ideologies and
fueled the ideological battles among different races and nation-states.
In the postwar years, in the midst of a collective affirmation of racial
unity based on common sentiments rooted in nature, history, and imagined-
ancestry, the "discourse on Japaneseness" (nihonjinron) was born and
constructed the core belief of national identity with assertions about unique
Japanese blood and thought processes.34 While "there is no such entity of
the 'Japanese race' in the objective sense, the Japanese have tended to
perceive themselves as a distinct 'racial group."35 Ironically, in the postwar
years, the notion of Japanese "purity" and unconnectedness to their former
Asian colonies retained salience with the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, only
now it was used to explain why the Japanese had been ill-suited to running
an empire and to explain why the empire had been so brutal. Japanese
"purity" also became the foundation of a new "anti-imperial" ideology for
postwar Japan in which Japanese as a unique ethnic group in the world were
inherently inward-oriented and therefore non-expansionist. The prewar
empire was dismissed as an aberration and the "racial supremacy" of the
Japanese that undergirded Japanese militarism was tamed as a "racial
uniqueness" that guaranteed Japanese peacefulness. Japan's national
identity, especially in the postwar years, was built upon the myth of a unified
and uniquely shared imagined community based on the purity of race.
32. T. FUJITANI, RACE FOR EMPIRE: KOREANS AS JAPANESE AND JAPANESE AS AMERICANS
DURING WORLD WAR 11 (2011) (presenting a revision of this argument about the hegemony of
"pure blood" during the war through a comparison of Japanese Americans and Korean Japanese
during the war, arguing that the pressures of the war, especially the demands for total mobilization,
led to a resurgence of a "liberal" line on the potential for Korean equality under a "brotherhood"
discourse).
33. JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR
(1986).
34. KOSAKU YOSHINO, CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY (2005).
35. Id. at 24.
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A. State Propaganda on Race and Japan's Racial Supremacy in Asia and
Beyond
The Japanese government had been fully aware of the power of
propaganda, the new science of population control without the use of force
or violence. Both British and American governments used propaganda
campaigns to achieve their political agendas in the beginning of the twentieth
century. The British Ministry of Information convinced American elites to
participate in the First World War, while the Committee on Public
Information ("CPI"), created by Woodrow Wilson in 1917, also helped
transform isolationist Americans into raging war mongers stirred by jingoist
hysteria within a matter of six months.36 Adolf Hitler also noted in his
autobiography, Mein Kampf (My Struggles), the effectiveness of U.S.
propaganda strategies and he concluded that Germany lost WWI because it
lost the propaganda battle. Hitler pledged that next time around they would
have their own propaganda system, which they did during WWII. 3 7 Hitler's
Mein Kampf was also studied by Japanese scholars and its first full
translation was published in 1932.38 The American business community also
became impressed by the propaganda effort, and Edward Bemays, a key CPI
member who also published the book Propaganda in 1928, went on to build
the first public relations industries in the U.S. Bemays stated that it was
possible to "regiment the public mind every bit as much as an army
regiments their bodies." 3 9 The Japanese government emulated the U.S. and
German propaganda agencies, and multiple Japanese agencies were created
and mobilized, including the Cabinet Board of Information, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, military propaganda specialists, Special Higher Police
(Tokko Keisatsu) personnel, both public and private media, commercial
advertisers, publishers, and writers who all worked to implant and
disseminate Japan's justification of imperial ventures against perceived
internal enemies such as communists, socialists, anarchists, and Korean and
Chinese nationalist subversives. 40 Japanese imperial ventures in China and
other regions were also justified in order to prevent Western Powers'
intrusion in Asia and bring liberty for all Asians from the tyranny of white
36. NOAM CHOMSKY & DAVID BARSAMIAN, PROPAGANDA AND THE PUBLIC MIND 164
(2015).
37. ADOLF HITLER, MEINKAMPF (James Murphy trans. 1925).
38. TAKAJI SAKAI, YONO-TOSO [MY STRUGGLES] (1932). Other Japanese scholars also
translated the book and published their work in Japan.
39. EDWARD BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA 52 (1928).
40. BARAK KUSHNER, THOUGHT WAR: JAPANESE IMPERIAL PROPAGANDA (2007).
[Vol. 45:3542
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rule, though Japan's racial narratives themselves instituted much of the same
vision of racial hierarchy of the West that they supposedly disparaged."
The Japanese government also created a police agency to ensure public
compliance with state propaganda. For example, the Special Higher Police
that was dubbed as "thought police" imposed heavy surveillance on the
general population, arrested and tortured dissidents considered "seditious,"
and refused to follow the official line of propaganda. This special police unit
was created by the Home Ministry in 1911 after a planned assassination
attempt on the Meiji Emperor. Its mission then expanded to monitor
subversive activity and civil unrest by foreign agents, communists,
anarchists, and other insurgent elements.4 2 The Police Bureau of the Home
Ministry also published numerous propaganda journals and periodicals, such
as the Special Higher Police Monthly Report, Foreign Activities Monthly,
Foreign Activities Police Report, and Police Report on Publishing. These
journals promoted imperial propaganda, justifying Japan's aggressive
imperial ventures, while monitoring the potentially seditious activities of
Chinese and Koreans in Japan and abroad.4 3 What deviated from Nazi
ideology and propaganda was the use of Confucianism and patriarchal
family relations adopted in the schematics of racial relations in Asia. The
racially superior Japanese were supposed to serve as parents over other Asian
children in a strict racial hierarchy in order to rule eternally over the family
of Asian nations. The document also implied that Japan would eventually
become the head of the family of global nations.
Until the Japanese invasion of China in the late 1930s, Japanese
propaganda stressed Japan's commonalities and shared characteristics of
culture and tradition with people in the Asian peripheries. 4 As Japan
represented both the culmination and combination of all Asian cultures and
people, Japanese propaganda exploited heterogeneous traits and common
backgrounds to promote further economic investment and expansion, as well
as the imposition of colonial ventures and political interventions in Asian
countries.46 As Japan's military power, industrial might, economic wealth,
41. KUSHNER, supra note 40.
42. KUSHNER, supra note 40, at 51-53.
43. KUSHNER, supra note 40, at 52.
44. KUSHNER, supra note 40, at 22. See also Helen Tomoko Tanabe, Military Use of the
Japanese Educational System for War Propaganda During the Years 1931-37 (1960) (unpublished
M.S. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, on file with the University of Wisconsin, Madison,
General Library System) (discussing the impact of Confucianism on imperial educational policies).
45. See EIji OGUMA, A GENEALOGY OF 'JAPANESE' SELF-IMAGE (2002).
46. Id.
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and ideology of national confidence grew, Japan's heterogeneous character
in culture and people was transformed to stress the purity of Japanese blood
and the supremacy of the Yamato race. By the time Japan decided to invade
China in 1937, propaganda on the uniqueness of the Japanese race reinforced
the idea that racial others in Asia no longer fit into domestic and international
social agendas.47 In August 1937, for example, the government launched a
movement called "Mobilizing the Spirit of all Japanese Nationals" (Kokumin
Seishin Sodoin), to enlist the colonial peoples of Korea and Taiwan for the
Sino-Japan War.4" Korean and Taiwanese soldiers who were conscripted into
the Japanese Imperial Army were treated as nonnationals and were ineligible
for benefits given to Japanese military personnel. Yet, after the war Korean
and Taiwanese soldiers still faced charges as members of the Japanese wartime
military and many of them were executed for their war crimes. 49
At the end of WWII, Japanese propaganda perpetuated this strict
hierarchical view of Asia in racial terms. With Japan at its apex, the
propaganda asserted that Japan's three thousand year history and
unparalleled racial supremacy bestowed a civilizing mission on the
country.50 The racial hierarchy was clearly spelled out in the 1943 Ministry
of Health, Labor and Welfare population policy program report, called "An
Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus."5 The
Meiji Constitution established that the Emperor was a direct descendant of
the original Yamato clan. 52 This secret report surveyed the European
concept of race from Plato, and other Greek philosophers, to German
scientists, drawing connections between racism, nationalism, and the
justification of imperial ventures.53
47. OGUMA, supra note 45.
48. CHIEN-JUNG Hsu, THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAIWAN'S MEDIA 8
(2014).
49. BRUCE STRONACH, BEYOND THE RISING SUN: NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN
153 (1995).
50. BARAK KUSHNER, THE THOUGHT WAR: JAPANESE IMPERIAL PROPAGANDA 9, 36
(2006).
51. THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, YAMATO MINZOKU WO
CHUKAKU TO SURU SEKAI SEISAKU NO KENTO [AN INVESTIGATION OF GLOBAL POLICY WITH THE
YAMATO RACE AS NUCLEUS] (July 1, 1943).
52. R. H. P. MASON & J. G. CAIGER, A HISTORY OF JAPAN: REVISED EDITION 39 (1997) (The
promulgation of the Meiji Constitution was "one of the great occasions of the reign, the date chosen,
the national foundation day, was the anniversary of the legendary accession of Emperor Jimmu to
the throne of Yamato in 660 B.C.").
53. THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, supra note 51.
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B. Post-War Japanese Supremacy and Racism
Such a strong sense of racial superiority over Asian neighbors
continued after WWII largely due to U.S. Cold War strategies in Asia, which
placed Japan on the U.S. side against many Asian countries that Japan had
ruled in the first half of the twentieth century; including Communist China
after the takeover of the mainland in 1949, North Korea during the Korean
War in the early 1950s, and North Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s.
The Japanese government also supported other U.S. policies in Asia,
including the brutal military suppression of the democratic movement in
Vietnam in the 1950s, the military coup of the Sukarno government in
Indonesia in 1965, and the bombings of Laos and Cambodia during the
Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s, among others; thereby, placing
themselves on the side of the U.S. to support policies designed to curtail and
eliminate internal insurgents in Asia and bring "freedom and prosperity" to
the region, a similar justification propagated by imperial Japan in the early
half of the twentieth century.54
Japanese propaganda of racial purity and the uniqueness of the Japanese
race returned to post-WWII Japan largely due to the support of the Allied
Forces. The original policies of the allied occupation were to democratize
Japan by deconstructing the Zaibatsu, long controlled by corporate oligarchs,
and prosecuting high-ranking fascist war criminals. Washington soon
changed their policies in the late 1940s and decided to release Class-A war
criminals, support fascist collaborators, and reconstitute prewar conservative
business rules. George Kennan, an American diplomat and the principal
architect of a top secret policy planning report called PPS/23, argued:
"Recognizing that the former industrial and commercial leaders of Japan are
the ablest leaders in the country, that they are the most stable element, that
they have the strongest natural ties with the U.S., it should be U.S. policy to
remove obstacles to their finding their natural level in Japanese leadership."
The new U.S. policy in Japan terminated the purge of Japanese war criminals
and reinstalled the fundamental structure of Japan's pre-war fascist regime
that was responsible for the creation and manifestation of prewar Japanese
propaganda that emphasized the purity of Japanese blood and the uniqueness
of the Yamato race and culture.
The Japanese government's support, and in some cases, indifference, to
postwar U.S. military maneuvers and interventions in Asia helped solidify a
54. Robert A. Fisher, The Erosion of Japanese Pacifism: The Constitutionality of the 1997
U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 394, 400 (1999).
55. NoAM CHOMsKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST CONTINUES 249 (1993).
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close alliance with the U.S. and maintain the superior socio-political position
of Japan in the region. Such U.S. actions included U.S. genocidal policies
in East Timor in the 1970s and 1990s, 5 6 the support of the Thai government
in opposition to the democratization of Cambodia in the aftermath of halting
the Khmer Rouge genocide against its own population-a regime that was
supported by the Reagan Administration throughout the 1980s57 -military
and political support to stop the democratization of South Korea in the late
1980s, 5" among many others. As the only country in Asia that escaped
Western colonial occupation, Japan developed its economy and industry
with strong protectionist policies, and justified the economic and political
exploitation of Asian countries through its racialized propaganda. Japan's
political acquiescence led to the expansion of American and Western
colonial projections that the prewar Japanese government, at least
rhetorically, tried to prevent by its own imperial policies in Asia.
II. A Lack of Redress or Reparation for Japan's Minorities
The Japanese government has not acknowledged racism or the role of
"Japanese supremacy" used to justify imperial projects that led to massive
atrocities in both Japan and Japanese colonized Asian peripheries. The post-
WWII German government has accepted responsibility for the Holocaust
which was based on a racist doctrine that led to the death and immiseration
of millions of Jews, Slavs, Roma, and other racially "undesirable"
populations in German-occupied areas of Europe. Post-WWII German
reparation programs then became one of the largest reparation programs ever
implemented. Reparations were paid to the State of Israel, as well as Jewish
Holocaust survivors regardless of their nationality.5 9 The U.S. government
also finally accepted responsibility for the racism behind President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's 1942 executive order that led to the removal and
incarceration of more than one hundred thousand people of Japanese
56. See MATTHEW JARDINE, EAST TIMOR: GENOCIDE IN PARADISE (2d ed. 1999).
57. KENTON CLYMER, THE UNITED STATES AND CAMBODIA, 1969-2000: A TROUBLED
RELATIONSHIP (2013).
58. MI PARK, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A HISTORY OF SOUTH KOREAN STUDENT
MOVEMENTS, 1980-2000 141-43 (2008).
59. See generally ARIEL COLONOMOS & ANDREA ARMSTRONG, GERMAN REPARATIONS TO
THE JEWS AFTER WORLD WAR II, THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 390 (Pablo De Greiff ed.
2006) (arguing that the way in which Germany responded to war atrocities was different from
Japan's because of varied historical context and interpretations of war memories. We argue that
the common thread that penetrates different historic cities of two countries was the common use of
racism to perpetuate war crimes.). See Alan S. Christy, Germany: Japan: Apples: Oranges:
Rethinking War Memory Studies, 3 BUNKASHIGENGAKU 1 (2006).
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ancestry during WWII. Political activism and grassroots efforts for many
decades finally forced the U.S. government to accept that the mass removal and
incarceration policies were motivated by racism. The government also passed
the Civil Liberties Act in 1988 which required a formal government apology and
the payment of $20,000 compensation to each of the surviving victims.
While many attempts have been made to force the Japanese government
to pay reparations to victims by Asian neighbors, the litigation in Japanese
courts has not been successful. 60 Asian victims, including former military sex
slaves and prisoners of war who were forced to become slave laborers, also
filed a civil lawsuit in U.S. Federal Court, using the 1789 Alien Tort Claims
Act against Japanese firms that benefitted from Japanese imperial projects
during Japanese colonial rule.6 1 However, the federal court has so far ruled in
favor of Japanese corporations that operated in Asia in conjunction with
Japan's imperial government and local business establishments.62
A. Japanese American Redress/Reparation Movements
Redress activists in Japan note that the U.S. government apologized and
provided compensation for victims of racist policies during WWII, in 1988.
In the United States, Japanese Amenicans and their allies fought for more
than four decades to obtain redress for the WWII mass removal and
incarceration of Japanese Americans. Several factors played critical roles in
helping this effort succeed. First, Japanese-American activists needed to
persuade the community that it was time to end decades of silence and to
seek justice from the government.63 Second, they had to present the evidence
that imprisoning 110,000 people, two-thirds of whom were U.S. born
citizens, was unjust and was caused by racism and illegitimate national
security concems.64 Third, Japanese Americans had to educate the public on
the extent of the suffering they experienced during and after the war to
counter images that they had recovered and succeeded as a "model minority"
because they embraced educational and occupational opportunities and
60. Philip A. Seaton, JAPAN'S CONTESTED WAR MEMORIES: THE 'MEMORY RIFTS' IN
HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF WORLD WAR 1153 (2007).
61. See LEGACIES OF THE COMFORT WOMEN OF WORLD WAR II (Margaret D. Stez & Bonnie
B. C. Oh eds., 2015).
62. Id.
63. See generally ALICE YANG MURRAY, HISTORICAL MEMORIES OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR REDRESS (2007).
64. Id. See also FRANKLIN ODO, THE COLUMBIA DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE ASIAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 5 (2002).
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eschewed the protest tactics of "radical" minorities. 65 This required former
prisoners to share accounts of the anguish they and their families endured
because they were uprooted from their homes and forced to live in camps
surrounded by barbed wire. Finally, the community needed to win public
support by getting positive media coverage of redress activists, strengthening
alliances with advocates outside the community, and persuading key political
leaders, including conservatives as well as liberals, to endorse the campaign. 6 6
In many ways, the first obstacle of getting victims of racism to band
together as a community and denounce their oppression was the most
daunting. The racism that caused Japanese Americans as a group to be feared
as spies and saboteurs was not just a product of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
It had become entrenched by discriminatory legislation that targeted
Japanese Americans for many decades before WWII started.67 Japan's
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 helped revive anti-Japanese
racism on the West Coast that had vilified Japanese immigrants and their
children ever since they began arriving in large numbers in the 1880s.
Japanese immigrants became victims of the anti-Asian "yellow peril"
imagery that had been cultivated to attack Chinese immigrants in the 1840s
and led to Chinese exclusion in 1882. 68 While the end of Chinese
immigration at first contributed to the recruitment of Japanese immigrant
laborers, it did not take long before the anti-Chinese forces turned their
attention to these immigrant laborers. These forces argued that Japanese
were dangerous and unassimilable, which achieved the ending of Japanese
immigration in 1924. State "alien land laws," first passed by California in
1913, prevented Japanese immigrants from owning land. Japanese
immigrants also could not become naturalized American citizens after the
Supreme Court ruled in 1922 in Ozawa v. U.S. that they were racially
"ineligible for citizenship" because they were not white. 69 Anti-
miscegenation laws, school segregation, and employment discrimination
made it clear that immigrants and their children were seen as racially inferior.
65. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 193.
66. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 256-59.
67. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 22-23.
68. See ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA'S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE
EXCLUSION ERA, 1882-1943 (2003); MOON-HO JUNG, COOLIES AND CANE: RACE, LABOR, AND
SUGAR IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION (2006); ADAM MCKEOwN, MELANCHOLY ORDER: ASIAN
MIGRATION AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF BORDERS (2011); and JOSHUA PADDISON, AMERICAN
HEATHENS: RELIGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION IN CALIFORNIA (2012).
69. Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of
Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM.
HIST. 67, 81 (1999).
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Pearl Harbor revitalized the xenophobic forces on the West Coast that
had attacked Japanese Americans for many decades. The Native Sons of the
Golden West denounced "treacherous Japs" for "colonizing in strategic
locations" while a representative for the Grower-Shipper Vegetable
Association called for the eviction of "Japs" so that "white farmers can take
over." 70 California Congressman Leland Ford called for the creation of "inland
concentration camps" and helped persuade a delegation of representatives from
California, Washington, and Oregon to send a letter to President Roosevelt
recommending the removal of "all persons of Japanese lineage. "71
Ironically, while many of the politicians calling for the imprisonment
of Japanese Americans on the West Coast cited false claims of sabotage or
espionage at Pearl Harbor as evidence of a security threat posed by Japanese
Americans, there was no mass removal or incarceration in Hawai'i. 7 2 While
Japanese Hawaiians also were viewed with suspicion and distrust during the
war, they were a large percentage of the population and played a major role
in rebuilding Pearl Harbor.73 In Hawai'i, people of Japanese ancestry made
up thirty-seven percent of the total population and were a vital source of
labor.74 As a result, military governor General Delos Emmons resisted calls
by President Roosevelt and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox for mass removal
and implemented a policy of selective incarceration of approximately two-
thousand individuals labeled as potentially disloyal.75 Some of these
individuals had been under surveillance for years before the war started
because of their positions as community leaders-prominent businessmen,
Japanese Association officials, Japanese language teachers, and Buddhists
priests-and were classified as "enemy aliens" because of these roles rather
than any specific evidence of wrongdoing. 76 Rounded up within hours of the
70. MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE
EVACUATION 48 (1949).
71. Roger Daniels, AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RELOCATION AND INCARCERATION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS, 1942-1945 (Roger Daniels ed.
1989) (citing Letter from Leland M. Ford to Henry L. Stimson (Jan. 16, 1942)); see also
COMMISSIoN ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED 81-82 (1942) (citing recommendations of the Pacific Coast Subcommittee on Alien
Enemies and Sabotage).
72. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 28-29.
73. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 28-29.
74. LOUISE CHIPLEY SLAVICEK, DANIEL INOUYE 57 (2007) ("At the time of Pearl Harbor
attack, persons of Japanese descent represented 37 percent of the Island's total population and the
majority of Hawaii's agricultural laborers, transportation workers, and skilled tradesmen.").
75. Id.
76. See generally Harry N. Scheiber et al., Hawai'i's Kibei under Martial Law: A Hidden
Chapter in the History of World War II Internments, 22 W. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2009).
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attack on Pearl Harbor, many of these immigrant leaders were taken to
detention camps run by the army and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS"). While they received hearings in these camps, they were
denied legal representation and were often imprisoned for the duration of the
war based on little or no evidence.
Other Japanese Americans on the islands, while not incarcerated,
endured martial law for almost three years until October 24, 1944.7' All
residents had to submit to a curfew, registration and fingerprinting, and army
control over wages and working conditions. Japanese immigrants could not
travel or change residences without prior authorization or meet in groups of
more than ten people during blackouts. Excluded from certain areas in
O'ahu, many farmers lost valuable property and fishermen lost their jobs
because of fears they could be spies. Habeas corpus was suspended until
1944 and military courts, which failed to provide due process rights such as
warrants for the search and seizure of evidence, replaced civilian courts. 79
The mistreatment of Japanese Hawaiians by Emmons, however, was
very different from the way Japanese Americans living on the West Coast
were treated by his counterpart, John L. DeWitt, head of the Western
Defense Command. Initially, Dewitt was more concerned about the danger
posed by all "enemy aliens," including German and Italian immigrants, than
about second generation Japanese American citizens. Meetings with
California politicians supporting removal, such as Governor Culbert Olson
and Attorney General Earl Warren, along with the influence of his friend
Allen Gullion, Army Provost Marshall, and Gullion's assistant Karl
Bendetsen helped persuade him that citizens of Japanese ancestry also
threatened strategic areas.so As DeWitt later explained in the government's
official justification for mass removal and incarceration, "the Japanese race
is the enemy race" and while generations born in the US might be
"Americanized" citizens, the "racial strains are undiluted.""' At a 1943 press
conference, he unapologetically reiterated this racist rationale by declaring
to reporters, "a Jap's a Jap."82
President Roosevelt's history of anti-Japanese prejudice, exemplified
by his support for alien land laws and immigration restrictions, may explain
77. Id. at 12-20.
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id. at 62-71.
80. JOHN L. DEWITT, U.S. ARMY, JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 34
(1943), http://jerrykang.net/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2010/10/dewitt-revised-final-report.pdf.
8 1. Id.
82. Transcript of Conference, "DeWitt and Newspapennen," Apr. 14, 1943, Record Group
338, National Archives and Records Service, Wash. D.C.
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why he approved plans to remove all Japanese Americans despite clear
evidence that the group posed no security threat. As tensions with Japan
increased in the weeks before Pearl Harbor, the president commissioned an
investigation by John Franklin Carter that determined there was "no
Japanese 'problem' on the Coast" and that the Nisei (second generation US
born citizens) were "pathetically eager" to show their loyalty. Based on
businessman Curtis B. Munson's consultation with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and naval intelligence, the report, as Carter noted, concluded
that the "Japanese are more in danger from the whites than the other way
around." 83 Carter, however, also provided a one-page summary that
misleadingly highlighted a few concerns raised by Munson that there might
be the "odd case of fanatical sabotage" and that "dams, bridges, harbors,
power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere."
Predisposed to view Japanese Americans in racialized terms, Roosevelt
may have misinterpreted these warnings as evidence of a much larger
menace that made him more receptive to the members of the War
Department who lobbied for mass removal then Attorney General Francis
Biddle and members of the Justice Department who worried about
citizenship rights. Apparently indifferent to concerns about the
constitutional rights of citizens, Roosevelt left this decision up to Secretary
of War Stimson, who ultimately supported mass removal because of fears
that the Nisei might help Japanese raids on the West Coast." On February
19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing
Stimson or any military commander he selected, to remove people from
designated military areas. 86 While the order never specifically named
Japanese Americans, it became immediately apparent that only they would
be targeted for mass removal.
Given the long history of anti-Japanese racism, it is not surprising that
very few Japanese Americans felt it worthwhile to challenge the legality of
Executive Order 9066. While sympathetic neighbors and Christian supporters,
83. See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS 123 (2001); HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE
SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 66 (1948).
84. STIMsoN & BUNDY, supra note 83, at 68.
85. DeWitt, supra note 80, at 105 ("there are already 'rumblings' of vigilante activity which
has been caused in the main, by the influx of Japanese from the evacuated areas").
86. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
87. YASUKO I. TAKEZAWA, BREAKING THE SILENCE: REDRESS AND JAPANESE AMERICAN
ETHNICITY 30 (2014) ("although Executive Order 9066 did not specify Japanese residents or
Japanese Americans, nationals of other enemy countries and their descendants were never subject
to mass evacuation and internment").
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most notably members of the American Friends Service Committee, tried to
help Japanese Americans prepare for removal, Norman Thomas, the Socialist
candidate for president, was the only national figure to condemn Executive
Order 9066 as "totalitarian justice" in public speeches.""
Even the national American Civil Liberties Union, the usual standard
bearer for citizenship rights, was divided on how to respond to Executive
Order 9066. On March 20, as the government prepared removal plans,
ACLU director Roger Baldwin sent President Roosevelt a letter on behalf of
the board, questioning the order's "constitutional grounds of depriving
American citizens of their liberty and use of their property without due
process of law." Instead of uprooting all Japanese Americans from the West
Coast, the letter called for individual loyalty hearings for Japanese
Americans.8 9 This letter provoked a split in the board between those who
wanted to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066 and a
coalition of opponents that included those who felt the organization should
defer to the president and military in times of war, those who couldn't bear
to criticize their fellow liberal president, and those who believed the effort
to defeat fascism required their unquestioning support. 90 The board voted 2-
1 to approve a resolution that affirmed the government's ability to establish
military zones that could exclude people "when their presence may endanger
national security" and Baldwin informed West Coast offices on June 22 that
they should not sponsor cases opposing the government's right to remove
Japanese American citizens.
A few maverick lawyers, however, agreed to help Japanese Americans
willing to bring legal challenges. Ernest Besig, Executive Director of the
ACLU Northern California branch, informed Baldwin that he would not drop
the case of Fred Korematsu. Korematsu had been arrested in San Leandro,
California, in May 1942 for refusing to report for incarceration. 91 Unlike
Minoru Yasui and Gordon Hirabayashi, who wanted to mount legal test
cases, Korematsu was simply a welder who didn't want to leave behind his
Italian American girlfriend.92 After he was arrested, however, Korematsu
88. See generally Greg Robinson, Norman Thomas and the Struggle Against Japanese
Internment, 29 PROSPECTS 419 (2009); Robert Shaffer, Cracks in the Consensus: Defending the
Rights ofJapanese Americans During World War 11, 72 RADICAL HIST. REV. 84 (1998).
89. STEPHANIE BANGARTH, VOICES RAISED IN PROTEST: DEFENDING NORTH AMERICAN
CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY IN NORTH AMERICA, 1942-49 53 (2008).
90. Id.
91. See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES (1983).
92. Id. at 95.
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was approached by Besig who visited him in jail and asked if he'd consider
filing a lawsuit against forced removal even though the climate of racism and
judicial deference to the military made success unlikely. Impressed by
Besig's commitment to this obviously uphill battle, Korematsu agreed.93
Besig then recruited attorney Wayne Collins to represent Korematsu for the
test case. Unhappy with the ACLU's "vacillating policy," Besig informed
Baldwin that since he had taken Korematsu's case before the June 22
decision, he felt obligated to continue. Collins, known for his belligerence,
then deliberately ignored the national office's directives and explicitly
attacked Executive Order 9066 as unconstitutional.9 4 Besig and Collins also
defended Japanese Amenicans who protested against mass confinement
within the camps. Besig helped individuals challenge their "imprisonment
within a prison" as another violation of due process and supported Wayne
Collins as he represented thousands of citizens who claimed they had been
pressured by government authorities and factional leaders to renounce their
citizenship and fought government attempts to deport them during and after
the war.95
Other lawyers also defended Japanese-Americans protesters. Jewish
attorney A. L. Wirin represented Ernest and Toki Wakayama when they
came to the Southern California branch of the ACLU in April 1942 to
challenge their incarceration.96 Ernest, a World War I veteran and American
Legion officer, seemed an ideal plaintiff and Wirin accepted the case. 9 7
When leaders of the CIO pressured him to drop the case, he refused, resigned
from the ACLU and opened his own firm. Working with African-American
attorney Hugh Macbeth, Wirin filed a habeas corpus petition for the
Wakayamas while they were imprisoned at the Manzanar camp charging that
there was no "military necessity" for mass removal and that DeWitt's
exclusion order usurped civilian authority. 98 In oral arguments, Macbeth
also charged that imprisoning Japanese Americans in camps was
unconstitutional racial discrimination. 99 The court refused to act on the
93. Id. at 97-99.
94. Id. at 58.
95. DONALD E. COLLINS, NATIVE AMERICAN ALIENS: DISLOYALTY AND THE
RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP BY JAPANESE AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR 11 (1985).
96. IRONS, supra note 91, at 114-15.
97. IRONS, supra note 91, at 114-15.
98. Greg Robinson, Defending Nikkei: Hugh MacBeth and the Japanese American
Internment, June 7, 2007, http://www.blackpast.org/perspectives/defending-nikkei-hugh-macbeth-
and-japanese-american-internment.
99. Id.
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petition until February 1943 and by that time, the Wakayamas were so
disillusioned by their treatment at Manzanar that they withdrew their petition
and requested "repatriation" to Japan. 00
Yet while individual lawyers like Besig, Collins, Wirin, and Macbeth
recognized and condemned the racism behind the mistreatment of Japanese
Americans, the nation's highest court ultimately upheld the policies of mass
exclusion and incarceration when it ruled, in a 6-3 decision in Korematsu v.
United States, that detention was constitutional because it was based on
"military necessity" and not racism.' 0 The December 18, 1944, majority
opinion by Hugo Black stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and subject to
tests of "the most rigid scrutiny." 102 Nevertheless, Black concluded
"pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions" 03 and that Fred Korematsu and other Japanese Americans were
excluded because "the properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security
measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West
Coast temporarily." 04
Some of the justices recognized that the government failed to present
evidence that Japanese Americans posed as a group a substantive security
threat. In his dissent, Justice Frank Murphy noted that "No adequate reason
[was] given for the failure to treat these Japanese Americans on an individual
basis by holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the
disloyal, as was done in the case of persons of German and Italian
ancestry." 05 Calling the decision a "legalization of racism," Justice Robert
Jackson's dissent declared the exclusion order a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause reminiscent of the "abhorrent and
despicable treatment of minority groups by the dictatorial tyrannies which
this nation is now pledged to destroy. "106
As the war continued, others also became more vocal in criticizing the
hypocrisy of wartime rhetoric touting America's commitment to defend
democracy abroad while discriminating against minorities at home.
100. IRONS, supra note 91, at 181.
101. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
102. Id. at 216.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 223.
105. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 241.
106. Id.
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Activists like A. Philip Randolph denounced unfair labor practices and
pressured President Roosevelt into banning discrimination in defense
industries with Executive Order 8802 in 1941 and compelled his successor,
President Harry S. Truman, into ending segregation in the armed forces in
1948 with Executive Order 9981.107
Others criticized the logic of "total war" that condoned targeting
civilians in Axis cities. While military authorities defended the bombing of
Hamburg in 1943 and Dresden in 1945, many took particular glee in wiping
out civilians in Japanese cities. Admiral William Halsey repeatedly called
the Japanese "yellow bastards" and "yellow monkeys" and told reporters in
early 1945 that he believed "the Japanese were a product of mating between
female apes and the worst Chinese criminals who had been banished from
China by a benevolent emperor." 's In March of 1945, Leatherneck, a
monthly U.S. Marine magazine, praised the US policy of firebombing
Japanese cities with the cartoon "Louseous Japanicas." Presenting the
Japanese as buck-toothed, bespectacled lice, the caption celebrated marine
efforts using "flame throwers, mortars, grenades, and bayonets" to remove
these pests from Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan. The caption proclaimed,
"[B]ut before a complete cure may be effected ... the origin of the plague,
the breeding grounds around the Tokyo area, must be completely
annihilated."l 09 While most Americans celebrated the devastation produced
by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Roy Wilkins drew a
parallel in the September 1945 issue of the NAACP's The Crisis between the
atomic bomb and racist attitudes that dehumanized the Japanese and condoned
roasting Japanese soldiers alive with flamethrowers. Such barbaric tactics
made Wilkins wonder, "who is barbarian and who is civilized?"" 0
Japanese Americans also began campaigning for redress during the war.
Draft resisters had called for the restoration of constitutional rights before
requiring compliance with induction procedures. After the War Relocation
Authority announced it would close the camps in 1945, thirty representatives
from seven camps organized a conference and sent a letter petitioning the
107. CYNTHIA TAYLOR, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH: THE RELIGIOUS JOURNEY OF AN AFRICAN
AMERICAN LABOR LEADER (2006).
108. JOHN DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 85
(1987).
109. Id. at 91.
110. PAUL BOYER, BY THE BOMB's EARLY LIGHT: AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE AT
THE DAWN OF THE ATOMIC AGE 199 (2005).
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government to provide financial payment for wartime losses before forcing
Japanese Americans to leave the camps."'
Certain leaders within the Japanese American Citizens League
("JACL"), however, believed that the best way to improve conditions for
Japanese Americans was to cooperate with camp officials and demonstrate
patriotism through military service. Immediately after Pearl Harbor,
Japanese Americans who tried to volunteer for the military were classified
as 4-C enemy aliens. Japanese Americans from Hawai'i who were already
in the army before the war started, however, were able to serve in the 100th
Infantry Battalion.11 2 JACL leaders helped publicize the 100th Battalion's
heroic record in Italy and the Varsity Victory Volunteers' labor for the army
in Hawai'i to convince military and political leaders of the merits of creating
a unit that would include Japanese Americans within the camps.11 3 The US
government also wanted to counter Japanese propaganda that anti-Japanese
racism and the mass incarceration in the US justified Japanese expansionist
oppression in Asia as a campaign against white supremacy and colonialism.
On March 23, 1943, the government created the 442nd Regimental Combat
Team ("RCT"), a segregated unit that would later incorporate the 100th
Battalion. Approximately 1,500 men from the mainland, most from within
the camps, volunteered for the 442nd. In Hawai'i, where there had been no
mass incarceration, almost 10,000 men responded to the call for military
service. The remarkable combat record of the combined 100th
Battalion/442nd RCT included 29 Distinguished Service Citations, 588
Silver Stars, over 4,000 Bronze Stars, and more than 4,000 Purple Hearts.
Only one Medal of Honor was awarded, but after a reevaluation was
conducted in 1997, twenty more were issued to recognize Japanese
American valor during the war." 4
JACL leaders trumpeted this history of loyalty and patriotism to
mobilize support to repeal the anti-Japanese legislation that discriminated
against Japanese immigrants as "aliens ineligible to citizenship." In 1947
A. L. Wirin petitioned the Supreme Court to invalidate the Alien Land Act
as a violation of Nisei citizens' Fourteenth Amendment rights stating it was
111. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY, COMMUNITY
GOVERNMENT IN WAR RELOCATION CENTER 99 (1946).
112. See generally, ROBERT ASAHINA, JUST AMERICANS: HOW JAPANESE AMERICANS WON
A WAR AT HOME AND ABROAD (2006).
113. Id. at 106-09.
114. Donn Jones, Congress to Bestow Highest Honor on Japanese-American Soldiers: Awards
Awakens Memories for Watsonville World War II Veterans, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, Oct. 31, 2011,
http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/article/zz/2011103 1/NEWS/1 11039586.
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race legislation that presumed any land they received from their immigrant
parents was a ploy to evade the law."1 5 In Oyama v. Califomia, the Supreme
Court in 1948 upheld the right of citizens to hold land purchased by
immigrant parents to get around California's alien land law.11 6 Then in the
1952 cases Sei Fuji v. Califomia and Masaoka v. Califomia, the court
affirmed the rights of immigrants themselves by determining that all alien
land laws violated their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 7
To win support for the 1948 Evacuation Claims Act, JACL leaders also
reminded Congress of Nisei heroism on the battlefield. The Act appropriated
$38 million to provide token compensation for lost property but omitted lost
opportunities, earnings, or interest. "1 More than 23,000 Japanese
Americans filed claims for over $131 million in damages and had to face
daunting bureaucratic hurdles, such as a lack of written documentation for
property lost during the week-long chaos before families were uprooted.119
Desperate for funds to help them start over after leaving camp, many families
accepted the government's counter-offer of $2,500 or three-fourths of their
original claim, whichever was less, to avoid years of litigation. 120
Although JACL leaders celebrated the government's acknowledgement
of its responsibility to provide at least token compensation, the
organization's decision to support the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration
Act proved controversial.121 More radical activists criticized this Cold War
anticommunist legislation because it increased federal powers to detain and
prosecute suspected subversives. The JACL supported the measure because
it ended Asian exclusion by providing token immigration quotas to Japan
and other Asian countries. It also affirmed the rights of immigrants to
become naturalized citizens. The Act's sponsors included the Asian
115. MARK BRILLIANT, THE COLOR OF AMERICA HAS CHANGED: HOW RACIAL DIVERSITY
SHAPED CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 1941-1978 (2012).
116. Id. at 28-41.
117. Id. at 218-21.
118. See generally BILL HOSOKAWA, NISEL: THE QUIET AMERICANS; THE STORY OF A
PEOPLE 446 (1969).
119. Id.
120. Nancy Nanami Nakasone-Huey, In Simple Justice: The Japanese-American Evacuation
Claims Act of 1948 (Nov. 6, 1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
California) (on file at ProQuest) (illustrating that sixty percent of these claims were for less than
$2,500. Others pursued litigation, but the last claim was not settled until 1965).
121. See generally William R. Tamayo, Asian Americans and the McCarran-Walter Act,
ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 337-528 (Hyung-ChanKim ed.,
1996).
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immigration and naturalization components to appeal to liberals and divide
congressional opposition. This strategy proved successful, the controversial
legislation passed, and Congress overrode President Truman's veto.122
B. The Reorganization of the JACL for the Redress Movement
The Act's more repressive features helped inspire campaigns to reform
the JACL from within and replace JACL's community leadership with more
militant groups in the 1960s and 1970s. Some leaders proclaimed pride in
the fact that relatively few Japanese Americans joined more militant
demonstrations by black power and anti-Vienam War activists against
government policies.1 23 A few even joined conservative commentators in
denouncing African-American and Latinx protesters for not emulating
Japanese Americans and pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps.1 2 4
This re-evaluation of individual and communal silence proved critical
in mobilizing support for redress activism in the 1970s. Before activists
could mount a mass movement, they had to persuade former victims to refute
images they had "recovered" from the war by speaking out about the
suffering that continued to haunt individuals, families, and the entire
community. JACL reformers, like Edison Uno argued that the time had
come for the organization to stop fearing a conservative backlash and align
itself with more "radical" civil rights and antiwar protesters.1 25 Uno joined
a growing chorus of former prisoners and Sansei (third generation) activists
that connected the wartime injustice with other historical and current
examples of discrimination against people of color. 126 These activists
sponsored pilgrimages to campsites and day of remembrance programs to
encourage former prisoners to share their accounts of the pain and anger
created by the wartime incarceration and to ensure that the injustice never
happened again.1 2 7
Activists in the 1960s and 1970s also dismantled claims that the camps
were necessary for national security by publicizing studies that documented
the racism behind mass exclusion and incarceration. To gain credibility
122. NAOKO SHIBUSAWA, AMERICA'S GEISHA ALLY: REIMAGINING THE JAPANESE ENEMY
269 (2006).
123. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 186.
124. HOSOKAWA, supra note 118, at 91.
125. Edison Uno, Manzanar-More Than a Memory, RAFU SHIMPO, Jan. 12, 1970. See also
Jim Matsuoka, December 27, 1969, reprinted in THE MANZANAR PILGRIMAGE: A TIME FOR
SHARING 12 (1981).
126. YANG-MURRAY, supra note 63, at 186-99.
127. YANG-MURRAY, supra note 63, at 186-99.
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outside the community, it was important that a growing list of books by non-
Japanese-American researchers could be cited as evidence for the injustice
of the incarceration. 128 Accounts by historian Roger Daniels and journalist
Allan R. Bosworth denounced government euphemisms that called mass
",129
removal an "evacuation" and labeled the camps as "relocation centers.
Instead, these authors argued that the camps should be called "concentration
camps" because they had caused widespread suffering. Documenting the
racist views of DeWitt and other architects of the incarceration, this
scholarship helped Japanese Americans recognize the camps were not just a
wartime "mistake," but reflected a long history of anti-Asian racism. 130
Researchers also began presenting evidence of suffering within the camps,
including the fact that several prisoners were shot and killed by trigger happy
guards, which helped activists persuade former prisoners that there was no
shame in sharing their personal accounts of trauma they experienced during
and after the war. Activists frequently quoted this scholarship to convince
Americans who had no familiarity with the Japanese-Amenican community
that the damage mass incarceration inflicted on individuals, families and the
community was significant and pervasive.131
To counter claims that Japanese Americans should "move on" and
avoid dwelling on the past, activists Edison Uno and Raymond Okamura
organized a grassroots campaign in 1967 to repeal Title II of the 1950
Internal Security Act to prevent other groups from being incarcerated
without due process. 132 This act provided funding for detention sites,
including the former Japanese-Amenican camp at Tule Lake, to imprison
individuals labeled as subversives without hearings. While the act
specifically targeted communist agitators, black power and antiwar
protesters feared that they also might be placed in "concentration camps."
After the campaign gained momentum within the ethnic community and
increasing media coverage, more conservative JACL lobbyists, Senator
Daniel Inouye, and Congressman Spark Matsunaga shepherded the
legislation through Congress in 197 1.133
128. YANG-MURRAY, supra note 63, at 234-40.
129. YANG-MURRAY, supra note 63, at 234-40.
130. YANG-MURRAY, supra note 63, at 234-40.
131. YANG-MURRAY, supra note 63, at 234-40.
132. Raymond Okamura, Background and History of the Repeal Campaign, 2 AMERASIA J.
73 (1974).
133. Hiroshi Kanno, Broader Implications of the Campaign (A Commentary), AMERASIA J.
105 (1974).
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This history of militant community activists putting pressure on more
conservative leaders who then used their political contacts to achieve
legislative changes became a model for redress' passage. In 1970, Edison
Uno persuaded the JACL to pass a resolution calling on the government to
"compensate on an individual basis a daily per diem requital for each day
spent in confinement and/or legal exclusion."l34 Uno passed away in 1976
without seeing any significant progress. Two years later, however, the JACL
elected an outsider, Clifford Uyeda, as president and he, in turn, recruited
John Tateishi, the son of a famous critic of the wartime JACL, to serve as
JACL's redress chair.1 3 5
Under this new leadership, the JACL developed a multifaceted
campaign to build support for redress. To overcome redress opponents and
skeptics within the JACL, Uyeda wrote thirty-five articles for the JACL's
newsletter defending the concept of redress and explaining that the
campaign's goal was not to "put a price tag on freedom or justice" but "to
acknowledge the mistake by providing proper redress for the victims of the
injustice, and thereby make such injustices less likely to recur. "136 To help
marshal support for one plan, the redress committee reviewed various
proposals that defined redress eligibility, form, and scope in different ways.
Seattle activists maintained that redress compensation should be determined
by the amount of time spent behind barbed wire. Critics of this plan argued
that it would penalize Japanese Americans who left camp early to serve in
the military, to attend college, and to find jobs to support their families.1 3 7
JACL old guard leaders, offended by the concept of individual
compensation, called for the creation of a community trust fund that could
support educational programs and charity projects. Critics of this plan
questioned who would administer the program and worried that public
relations programs would take priority over housing and health services for
low-income Japanese Americans.138
To achieve consensus, Uyeda and Tateishi incorporated components
from multiple proposals. Their 1978 proposal called for both a community
trust fund and payments of $25,000 to each individual, or their heirs, who
had experienced removal and incarceration regardless of age, national origin,
or camp experience. Ironically, the $25,000 figure was based on a fabricated
134. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 289.
135. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 290-93.
136. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 290-93.
137. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 290-93.
138. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 290-93.
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claim made by a JACL leader during hearings for the 1948 Evacuation
Claims Act that the Federal Reserve had calculated Japanese Americans lost
$400 million in property during the war. 139 Realizing that Japanese
Amencans needed to project an image of unity before the government, JACL
leaders designed a survey that disguised conflicting views of redress
eligibility and compensation. They simply asked if "the injustice of
internment affected your life" and if people favored the concept of redress
without wading into more specific definitions. 140 As a result, the campaign
could claim a mandate based on support by ninety-four percent of the
organization for redress and eighty-three percent for compensation.' 4 '
JACL activists then developed a media campaign to educate other
Japanese Amenicans and the mainstream public about the injustice Japanese
Amenicans experienced during the war. They were unintentionally assisted
by redress opponents who made inflammatory comments that attempted to
minimize or deny Japanese American suffering. The most prominent critic,
S. I. Hayakawa, a Canadian-born semanticist and Republican senator from
California who spent the war in Chicago, actually claimed the camps were
"the best thing that could have happened" to Japanese Americans because
they "forced them out of their segregated existence" and allowed them to
take "advantage of new opportunities." 42 News outlets spread Hayakawa's
claims along with redress criticism by others who continued to blame
Japanese Americans for Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and more
recent trade wars with Japan. Instead of diminishing support for redress, this
publicity boosted the campaign by enraging former prisoners who felt
compelled to counter Hayakawa's depiction of the benefits of mass removal
and incarceration and to debunk the racist conflation of Japan and Japanese
Americans.1 4 3 Such accounts made it difficult to argue that racism was an
irrelevant vestige of history and convinced more Japanese Americans to
become activists. 44
The creation of a federal commission to investigate the causes and
consequences of the wartime removal and incarceration became a vital
component in the passage of redress. Japanese-American members of
Congress advised JACL redress leaders that such a commission was
necessary to educate the public about what happened during the war. JACL
139. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 297.
140. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 298.
141. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 298.
142. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 287-88.
143. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 287-88.
144. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 287-88.
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leaders knew that this proposal would be controversial and would be
criticized as a stalling tactic or a replacement for meaningful redress. JACL
reformers, especially within the Seattle chapter, denounced this strategy and
argued there was no need for an investigation given the large body of
scholarship that documented the racism behind Executive Order 9066.145
Declaring that redress delayed was redress denied, JACL redress
leaders noted that increasing numbers of former prisoners were passing away
each month. Political leaders, however, recognized that having a
government commission provide an official determination of the injustice
was critical to win congressional support. Senator Daniel Inouye and
Congressmen Spark Matsunaga, Norman Mineta, and Robert Matsui co-
sponsored the legislation that created the Commission on the Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians in 1980.146 This Commission held
hearings in twenty cities around the country and included testimony from
more than 750 witnesses.1 47 As the National Coalition for Redress and
Reparations ("NCRR") activist Lillian Nakano explained, "the burden of
guilt has finally shifted onto the government, where it rightly belongs."
"Bitter tears," she proclaimed, "intermingled with pride and determination
as we reaffirmed our resolve to continue our quest for justice." "At every
city hearing," she noted, "the united demand for monetary reparations was
virtually unanimous, and irresistible."4 s
Media portrayals of the incredibly moving testimony completely
obliterated "model minority" images of Japanese Americans and increased
public understanding of the trauma experienced by former prisoners and
their children. For example, Time's 1981 article, "Burden of Shame," noted
the "terrible ironies" of Fourth of July celebrations held "behind barbed wire,
in the shadow of sentry towers" and "parents wasting away in tar-paper camp
shacks" that "proudly displayed starred banners indicating that their sons
were American soldiers." 49 While some Japanese Americans worried that
this focus on loyalty and patriotism obscured a history of protest and
resistance within the camps, it clearly helped in winning support for redress
outside of the Japanese American community.iso
145. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942,
which authorized the mass removal of Japanese Americans.
146. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 311.
147. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 350.
148. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 327.
149. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 345.
150. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 345.
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For Japanese Americans who wanted a more confrontational campaign,
the National Council for Japanese-American Redress ("NCJAR"), led by
William Hohri, filed a class action lawsuit in 1983.'t Hohri's NCJAR
newsletters reached 3,500 subscribers and mobilized support for the suit by
criticizing JACL cooperation with the government during the war and during
the redress movement and by presenting the suit as a continuation of wartime
resistance. The suit listed twenty-two causes of action and demanded
$10,000 per cause of action that included "constitutional violations, loss of
property and earnings, personal injury, and pain and suffering." 152
Demanding the "unambiguously adversarial" amount of $220,000 per
victim, and estimating a total number of 125,000 wartime victims, the
lawsuit called for $27.5 billion in compensation.1 5 3
NCJAR supporter and Commission researcher Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga
documented the suit's charges of government fraud and conspiracy when she
discovered evidence that the government deliberately suppressed and
withheld from the Supreme Court during the war. She found a draft copy of
General DeWitt's Final Report that stated Japanese American loyalty could
never be ascertained because "it was impossible to separate the sheep from
the goats." Recognizing that such a blatantly racist argument could weaken
the government's case before the Supreme Court because it eliminated the
pressure of time as a factor, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy
ordered that all copies of this report be destroyed and a revised version
prepared. One copy, however, escaped destruction and was discovered by
Herzig-Yoshinaga in the National Archives. 5 4 Legal historian Peter Irons
and a team of Sansei lawyers presented this draft report and other evidence
concealed from the Supreme Court to petition for a writ of coram nobis ("the
error before us") that ultimately vacated the wartime convictions of Fred
Korematsu, Minoru Yasui, and Gordon Hirabayashi. Media coverage of this
evidence and the oral arguments NCJAR presented before the Supreme
Court in 1986 helped redress gain additional support. Unfortunately for
NCJAR's twenty-five plaintiffs, the Supreme Court decided the lawsuit
belonged in a different jurisdiction, ordered that the case be heard by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and then refused to reconsider this
court's dismissal of the suit in 1988. NCJAR supporters and Congressman
151. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 302-04.
152. WILLIAM HOHRI, REPAIRING AMERICA: AN ACCOUNT OF THE MOVEMENT FOR
JAPANESE-AMERICAN REDRESS 225 (1988).
153. Id.
154. United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
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Barney Frank, however, have stated that that the lawsuit made JACL's
proposal for $25,000 appear to be more moderate and reasonable.155
JACL's campaign was bolstered when the Commission issued the
results of their investigation in two important public documents. The first
was a 1983 report, Personal Justice Denied, that definitively declared that
mass removal and detention were caused not by "military necessity" but by
"race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership." The
Commission deliberately issued these findings first so that the surrounding
publicity would highlight the injustice of the wartime removal and the
evidence of racism behind the decision. After giving the public four months
to digest and reflect on these findings, the Commission then disseminated a
series of recommendations that called for Congress and the President to
provide a national apology, $20,000 to all surviving prisoners, and an
educational foundation. The Commission selected $20,000 in compensation,
$5,000 less than the JACL had requested, to show it was supportive of the
JACL but still independent. Eliminating the eligibility of heirs also helped
avoid establishing a model for descendants of other victims of racism that
some feared would make redress a prohibitively costly precedent.1 56
The Commission's report and recommendations galvanized redress
activism but it would still take five years for the 1983 legislation to
implement the commission's recommendations to become law. 157 The
eventual success of these efforts shows the importance of analyzing internal
political dynamics and developing a campaign that takes into account
existing political power structures and is tailored to appeal to key political
leaders. Grassroots advocacy, especially by NCRR activists, helped sustain
the movement within the ethnic community. They sent more than 20,000
letters to members of Congress endorsing the legislation and in 1987, 120
activists affiliated with NCRR visited 101 congressional offices to lobby for
support. 1ss JACL redress leaders like Grayce Uyehara also mounted a
grassroots campaign by providing lobbying advice, sample endorsement
letters, and "action alerts" analyzing the redress position of every member of
Congress. JACL was especially adept at obtaining endorsements from allies
outside the ethnic community and by 1987 could cite redress support from
more than 200 organizations, including state legislatures and veteran group.
155. United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
156. HOHRI, supra note 152, at 350-53.
157. HOHRI, supra note 152, at 366-67.
158. HOHRI, supra note 152, at 366-67.
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159Democratic congressional representatives Norman Mineta and Robert
Matsui shared their personal stories of being incarcerated as children as they
urged the House to vindicate their families' loyalty and patriotism by
supporting the legislation. While a few left politicians like Ron Dellums
denounced the racism that led to the mass incarceration, most Democrats and
Republicans who endorsed redress cited the heroism of the 442nd to explain
their support.1 60
In the Senate, Spark Matsunaga, a popular senator from Hawaii and a
decorated veteran, persuaded 75 of his colleagues to co-sponsor the
legislation.161 JACL lobbyist Grant Ujifusa helped win over conservative
supporters by depicting redress as an indictment of liberal icon Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and intrusive big government.1 6 2 He also characterized
redress as a reward for military heroism and "model minority" restraint.
Given that redress activists in the 1970s initiated the campaign to refute this
"model minority" image, this strategy was ironic. Finally, to prevent Reagan
from vetoing the legislation, Ujifusa convinced Republican governor
Thomas Kean to remind the president of a wartime speech he gave while
presenting the family of Kazuo Masuda with a posthumous Distinguished
Service Cross.1 63 When Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act on August 10,
1988, he quoted this speech and declared "blood that has soaked into the
sands of a beach is all of one color." 64 Reagan's budgets, however, failed
to allocate funding for redress. Senator Daniel Inouye, the second-ranking
Democrat on the Appropriations Committee, then stepped in and made
redress an entitlement that provided $500 million in funding in 1991 and
1992 and $250 million in 1993.165
For many Japanese Americans, the passage of redress legislation
reaffirmed the US government's commitment to equality and the protection
of constitutional rights. Some activists truly hoped the Civil Liberties Act of
1988 would ensure that no other groups would ever experience the racist
hatred that led to the Japanese American mass incarceration. Other activists,
however, feared that the "racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of
political leadership," that the commission indicted, could be revived during
159. HOHRI, supra note 152, at 366-67.
160. HOHRI, supra note 152, at 371-73.
161. YANGMURRAY, supra note 63, at 371.
162. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 375-76.
163. YANG MURRAY, supra note 63, at 375-76.
164. HOHRI, supra note 152, at 374-78.
165. LESLIE HATAMIYA, RIGHTING A WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF
THE CIVIL LIBERTIES 185 (1994).
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other national crises. For these activists, the lesson of redress activism was
a determination to defend and protect other groups threatened by government
discriminatory policies. After 9-11, as Muslim and Arab Americans were
subjected to government round-ups, detention and deportation, these
activists drew parallels between racist policies during World War II and
during the war on terrorism.1 66 Denouncing the government's denial of due
process to suspected terrorists, they helped organize vigils and
demonstrations to send a message to the government that they would not
allow civil liberties to again be sacrificed in the name of national security.
III. Governmental Authority to Regulate Free Speech
The history of racism and racial hatred against Japan's minorities and
the U.S. government's decision to imprison Japanese Americans during
World War II has shown that governments have often acted against the
welfare and civil rights of racially marginalized populations in order to
achieve their political objectives. While Professor Craig Martin calls for
greater government action in revising Japanese hate speech laws to provide
stricter prohibitions and more concretely delineated sanctions, 167 greater
public debate and discussion may be needed to examine the ramifications of
such governmental decisions on the parameters of the freedom of speech.
The proposal to further empower the government in regulating the legal
framework of free speech may be potentially dangerous and even harm the
freedom of expression which has been guaranteed by both Japanese and U.S.
constitutions.1 68 For instance, as the latest Japanese hate speech bill was
hotly debated in April 2016, Takashi Nagao, a powerful Lower House
member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party from Osaka, argued that the
peaceful demonstrators who called for the U.S. military to get out of
Okinawa might be guilty of hate speech. Criticizing American military bases
could be construed as "unjust racial statements" against Americans, even if
the protests were directed against Japanese policies that supported the
disproportionately large presence of American military bases in Okinawa
and not an attack on all things American.1 69
166. NCRR 9/11 Committee, NIKKEI FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND REDRESS, http://www.ncrr-
la.org/about.html, (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
167. Martin, supra note 2.
168. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 21, para. 1 (Japan); U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
169. Eric Johnston, LDP Lawmaker Suggests Using Hate Speech Bill on Protesters in
Okinawa, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 26, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/26/national/
politics-diplomacy/ldp-lawmaker-suggests-using-hate-speech-bill-protesters-okinawa/.
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Similar concerns have been raised in the U.S. against proposals to
increase governmental regulation of the freedom of expression. Within the
first two months of Donald Trump's presidency in 2017, Republican lawmakers
in eighteen states proposed legislation that threatened the right to peaceful
assembly by significantly increasing the penalties for public protesters,
including blocking highways as a felony offense punishable by a five-year
prison sentence, seizing the assets of people who participate in demonstrations
that become violent, and switching the liability from drivers who unintentionally
hit protesters with their cars to the protesters themselves.1 70
Free speech rights also came under attack after a North Carolina state
senator was outraged by hecklers shouting "shame" and "bigot" at
Republican Governor Pat McCrory because he signed legislation requiring
transgender people to use public bathrooms that corresponded to the gender
listed on their birth certificates instead of their gender identity. 171 Dan
Bishop, the author of the bathroom law, announced in January 2017 that he
would sponsor legislation making it a crime to "threaten, intimidate or
retaliate against a present or former North Carolina official in the course of,
or on account of, the performance of his or her duties."l 72 He also declared
that people who join a "chanting mob" or become "ubiquitous leftist rioters"
could expect to face a five-year prison sentence. 173 In August 2017,
Massachusetts Republican state committee member Marty Lamb proposed
that a resolution condemning hate speech include "Black Lives Matter" as a
leftist hate group.1 7 4 Lamb, who is Jewish, argued that Black Lives Matter
activists' characterization of Israel's treatment of Palestinians as a "form of
genocide," preaches "hatred against me and my people to the same extent as
those white supremacists and need to be named." 175 Lamb's proposal
illustrates how public statements that some might view as legitimate
criticism can be seen by law makers as harmful hate speech.
Furthermore, in March 2017, Benjamin Cardin, a Democratic member
of Congress from Maryland, and Illinois Republican Senator Peter Roskam
introduced legislation that would make it a crime to support an international
170. Christopher Ingraham, Republican Lawmakers Introduce Bills to Curb Protesting in at
Least 18 States, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2017.
171. Abbie Bennett, Does Pat McCrory Need Protection? One NC Senator Thinks So, NEWS
& OBSERVER, Jan. 23, 2017.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Frank Phillips, State GOP Debates Condemning Hate Group-and That Might Include
Black Lives Matter, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 2017.
175. Id.
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boycott against Israel.1 7 6 This attempt to criminalize political speech and
activism was designed to shut down the boycott, divestment and sanctions
("BDS") movement that tries to pressure Israel to change its settlement
policies. The proposed legislation made promoting or even supplying
information about an anti-Israel boycott a crime punishable by fines of up to
$1 million and a twenty-year prison sentence. ACLU attorneys David Cole
and Faiz Shakir condemned the bill for targeting "free speech and political
beliefs" and noted that the bill "would prohibit even the act of giving
information to a U.N. body about boycott activity directed at Israel." 7 They
argued that individuals rather than the government "should have the right to
decide whether to support boycotts against practices they oppose." 7 One
might expect that such an obvious threat to free speech would be
immediately attacked. Unfortunately, as of July 2017, many lawmakers on
both sides of the aisle had supported the legislation. In the House, 174
Republicans and 63 Democrats agreed to become cosponsors. In the Senate,
29 Republicans and 14 Democrats agreed to become cosponsors. The bill's
backers included a pantheon of so called liberal champions, including Chuck
Schumer, Kirsten Gillibrand, Ted Lieu, Eric Swalwell, and Adam Schiff.17 9
The fact that recent politicians and law makers failed to recognize that
public boycotts and popular protestations should be a protected form of
expression under the First Amendment is appalling and suggests we should
think very carefully before increasing the power of government officials to
define threatening or hateful speech. These recent examples show why
empowering governments and their law makers, whether in the U.S. or
Japan, to define hate speech appropriately can be potentially dangerous and
further harm people's right to the freedom of expression.
A. Lessons Learned or Unlearned?
Despite great advances in the protection of the freedom of speech and
the public condemnation of racist government policies against Japanese
Americans and other marginalized communities, the discriminatory
treatment of Korean residents in Japan as well as Muslim and Arab
Americans in the U.S., especially after the 9/11 attack in 2001, is a sobering
reminder that there is still no guarantee that the government will refrain from
176. Israel Anti-Boycott Act, H.R. 1697, 115th Cong. § 720 (2017).
177. David Cole & Faiz Shakir, This Piece of Pro-Israel Legislation is a Serious Threat to
Free Speech, WASH. POST, July 24, 2017.
178. Id.
179. Glenn Greenwald, U.S. Lawmakers Seek to Criminally Outlaw Support for Boycott
Campaign Against Israel, INTERCEPT, July 19, 2017.
[Vol. 45:35689
DANGERS OF REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH
the adoption of racialized policies. In September 2017, the Japanese
government responded angrily to North Korea's ballistic missile launch over
the northern Island of Hokkaido.'8 s As international tension and Japanese
hostility toward North Korea increases, the Japanese government could view
Korean residents in Japan as potential spies and saboteurs and subject them
to increased surveillance, interrogation, and even preemptive detention
policies. If Korean residents attempted to defend their civil rights by
criticizing discriminatory policies of the Japanese government directed
against them, it is plausible that their criticisms of government policies could
be labeled as "anti-Japanese hate speech," and they might be prosecuted by
the government.
In the U.S., Muslim and Arab Americans have been targeted for
prosecution by the U.S. government. In the weeks following the 9/11 attack,
the Justice Department arrested and interrogated over 1,200 Muslim, Arab
and South Asian American "suspected terrorists."'s' Instead of charging
them with direct links to terrorists, the government held hundreds of these
individual suspects, the majority from Pakistan and Egypt, for immigration
violations such as overstaying temporary visas.18 2 On September 20, 2001,
the INS issued a rule allowing for detentions of indeterminate length during
periods of "emergency or other extraordinary circumstances. "183
Japanese Americans swiftly denounced such policies. In the hours and
days following the attack on the World Trade Center, the JACL issued
numerous press releases and action memos denouncing a presumption of
guilt by ethnic association. The organization warned Americans to not make
the same mistakes that "were made in the hysteria of World War II following
the attack on Pearl Harbor."s 4 On September 19, the JACL joined the
180. Motoko Rich, North Korea's Threat Pushes Japan to Reassess Its Might and Rights, N.Y.
TINMs, Sept. 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/world/asia/japan-north-korea-
missile-defense.htmnl.
181. Racial Profiling Post 9/11: A Threat to All Our Rights, SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE, Sept.
2002, https://www.socialistalternative.org/911-and-the-war-on-terror/racial-profiling-post-911-thr
eat-to-all-our-rights/.
182. Preventing Terrorism, MIGRATION NEWS, Nov. 2001, https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn
/more.php?id=2482.
183. S.D. Ikeda, For Asian Americans, a War on Two Fronts, Asian-American Village,
www.imdiversity.com. Noting that only ten to fifteen of those imprisoned for weeks and even
months were suspected of being Al Qaeda sympathizers, Jane Brunner, the vice mayor of Oakland,
also reminded the public of the treatment of Japanese Americans, condemned the government's
refusal to even release the names of the detained, called for an end to the use of "non-citizens as
scapegoats." See Jane Brunner, Letters to the Editor, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8, 2001.
184. Dale Ikeda, DOR Ground-Breaking Remarks, PINEDALE ASSEMBLY CTR. MEMORIAL,
Feb. 19, 2007, http://pinedalememorial.org/2007/02/19/dor-ground-breaking-remarks/.
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Organization of Chinese Americans and other groups for a rally at the
Japanese American National Memorial in Washington D.C., to urge
"solidarity and an end to hate-motivated violence." At the rally, Karen
Narasaki called for Americans to take to heart the "lessons of World War II"
when her "parents and hundreds of other Japanese-American families were
herded behind barbed wire simply because they happened to look like the
enemy."ss
Japanese Americans also joined other Americans in attacking the
sweeping powers given by the so-called Patriot Act, enacted six weeks after
9/11, to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors without judicial
oversight. They criticized FBI questioning of people based on their religion
or ethnicity at their workplaces and homes, the selective targeting and
enforcement policies of the INS, and the detention and deportation of Arab,
Muslim, and South Asian Americans for minor immigration violations. In
February 2003, John Tateishi, the national JACL executive director and
former redress chair, drew a parallel between the government's registration
program, targeting noncitizens from the Middle East, and the treatment of
Japanese, German and Italian permanent residents during World War 11.186
Both "alien registration" acts required immigrants to register, be
fingerprinted, and photographed. The Bush registration program, Tateishi
explained, "echoes something from our own experience in 1942," because it
was "really about racial identity" and "racial profiling" California
Congressman Mike Honda also called for the protection of legal residents of
foreign birth who were especially vulnerable.s7 The House passed his 2004
resolution to make February 19 a National Day of Remembrance that not
only condemned Executive Order 9066 for removing and imprisoning
Japanese Americans but also acknowledged the injustice of interning almost
11,000 German and over 3,000 Italian individuals labeled as "enemy aliens."
Honda explained that "at a time when inflamed passions from our current
conflict with Iraq and the war on terronism may prompt similar
discrimination against targeted ethnic groups, we must remember the lessons
from this shameful chapter in U.S. history."188
185. Americans Who 'Look Like the Enemy' Deplore Rising Number of Ethnic Attacks,
SEATTLE PI (Sept. 19, 2001), http://www.seattlepi.com/news/arficle/Americans-who-look-like-
the-enemy-deplore-1066290.php.
186. David L. Beck, House Supports Creation of Day of Remembrance, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Mar. 5, 2004.
187. Id.
188. Beck, supra note 186.
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Japanese American individuals and groups worked with Arab, Muslim,
and South Asian Americans to challenge discriminatory government
policies. The NCRR 9/11 Committee held a series of educational programs
with the Revolutionary Alliance of Women from Afghanistan, the Muslim
Public Affairs Council, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, and the
American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.' 89 J.T. Takagi's 7 minute
film, "Homeland Insecurity," released in December 2001, documented hate
crimes after the 9/11 attack and included comments by former Japanese
American detainees, comparing the jingoism and nationalism after Pearl
Harbor and the 9/11 attack.' 90 The 2004 Day of Remembrance program in
San Francisco highlighted the premier of Lisa Hoshino's, "Caught in
Between." This documentary provided interviews with former detainees,
their children, and citizens and immigrants from the Japanese and Muslim
American communities about being made the enemy, questioning freedom,
and fighting for civil liberties and human rights.191
One of the most prominent and passionate critics of racial profiling
during the war on terror was Fred Korematsu. In November 2002,
Korematsu and the coram nobis legal team that helped overtum his wartime
conviction for challenging exclusion and incarceration orders circulated a
letter, by email, calling for the removal of John Ashcroft as Attorney
General. His policies to "justify the mass internment of 'suspected
terrorists,"' they argued, were an attempt to "revive" the "ugly precedent"
set by the Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui decisions of 1943 and 1944.192
Korematsu also filed an amicus curiae brief in November 2003 to support
petitions on behalf of the hundreds of Guantanamo Bay detainees and Yaser
Esam Hamdi, an American citizen captured in Afghanistan and being held
in a military brig in Virginia. Korematsu, 84 and in frail health, declared in
his brief, "it is only natural that in times of crisis our government should
tighten the measures it ordinarily takes to preserve our security" but "we
know from long experience that we often react too harshly in circumstances
of felt necessity and underestimate the damage to civil liberties." 9 3
189. NCRR 9/11 Committee, supra note 166.
190. DVD: Homeland Insecurity (Third World Newsreel 2001).
191. DVD: Caught in Between: What to Call Home in Times of War (Densho Encyclopedia
2004).
192. Lessons of the WWIIInternment? Nov. 27, 2002, http://www.umass.edu/legal/Arons/250
-Summer04 /Lessons%/20of%/020the%/o20WWII%/`20Internnent.pdf
193. Linda Greenhouse, Finding Common Ground in Asking the Court to Act, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/11/us/finding-common-ground-in-asking-the-
court-to-act.html.
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While Fred Korematsu passed away in 2005, his daughter, Karen
Korematsu, along with Gordon Hirabayashi's son Jay and Minoru Yasui's
daughter Holly, filed an amicus curiae brief in September 2017 to oppose
President Donald Trump's Executive Order 13780, issued on March 6, 2017,
temporarily suspending travel to the U.S. for citizens of six Muslim-majority
nations (Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen) and for all refugees
lacking either a visa or valid travel documents.1 94 This order revised the
original order he issued in January 2017, popularly known as the "Muslim
ban," that Trump claimed would protect the country from possible terrorists.
The second order eliminated Iraq from the list, removed preferential
treatment for "persecuted religious minorities" hoping to come to the U.S.,
and abolished extra restrictions that had been placed on Syrian refugees. A
third revision, issued on September 24, restricted travel from eight countries:
Iran, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, Somalia, Yemen, Chad, and North Korea.1 95
Solicitor General Noel Francisco filed papers in November 2017 with
the Supreme Court defending the ban by claiming that the ban protects
"national security" and that "the Constitution and acts of Congress confer on
the President broad authority to prevent aliens abroad from entering this
country when he deems it in the nation's interest." 96 The three children of
former Japanese American defendants who appeared before the Supreme
Court, however, argued that these bans, regardless of minor revisions,
violated the Constitution and exceeded presidential authority under federal
immigration law. Their brief argued that their fathers' cases should serve as
"powerful reminders not only of the need for constant vigilance in protecting
our fundamental values, but also of the essential role of the courts as a check
on abuses of government power, especially during times of national and
international stress." They reminded the court that by "refusing to scrutinize
the government's claim that its abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans
was justified by military necessity," the Supreme Court during World War
II "enabled the government to cover its racially discriminatory policies in the
cloak of national security." 97 The brief urged the court to avoid repeating
194. Press Release, White House, Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nationfrom Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states.
195. Ariane de Vogue, Challengers Back at Supreme Court Hoping to Block Latest Travel
Ban, CNN, Nov. 28, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/28/politics/travel-ban-supreme-court/
index.html.
196. Id.
197. Chris Fuchs, Children of Internment Resisters Attack Travel Ban in Supreme Court Brief,
NBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/children-interniment-
resisters-attack-travel-ban-supreme-court-brief-n803241.
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"[the same] failures of the past" and "repudiate them and affirm the greater
legacy of those cases: Blind deference to the Executive Branch even in areas
in which decision-makers must wield wide discretion, is incompatible with
the protection of fundamental freedoms."l 98
Conclusion
This Article examined the history of Japan's racism against Asian
neighbors and Japanese residents of Asian and marginalized communities.
This Article also analyzed how Japanese-Ameican activism could lead to
the passage of redress legislation in 1988. The success of this movement
showed that more militant or radical activists could initiate a campaign
despite individual and community fears of a backlash. These communities
could present scholarship and other evidence to document the racism behind
the wartime injustice and persuade former victims to share their accounts of
the suffering they experienced before a government commission. The
Commission's recommendations to provide an apology, individual
compensation, and an educational fund then became the basis for redress
legislation. Developing a multifaceted campaign that included grassroots
activism within the ethnic community, a class action lawsuit and the political
lobbying of key officials showed the importance of assessing political power
structures and appealing to different constituencies within and outside the
Japanese-American community.
The recent re-emergence of racial animosity and deep-seated hatred in
Japan towards minorities accentuates the historical residue of racism that has
not been officially recognized by the Japanese government. Our study
substantiates that, after the Japanese declaration of independence and
sovereignty in 1868, political elites and state planners of the young
government incorporated racialized ideologies to promote a nation-state
building project. These propagated ideologies included a myth of racialized
ideology, an imagined national unity based on its divine ancestral roots in
the imperial family, and the racial superiority of Japanese people over other
Asian races. These ideologies helped strengthen the central authority of the
national government and facilitated the colonization and annexation of Asian
neighbors and regions. America's propaganda efforts during the First World
War and Hitler's analysis of Germany's WWI loss that he attributed to
ideological warfare strategies had been translated and studied by Japanese
political elites and policy planners who also went on to institute an elaborate
system of propaganda to further facilitate and justify Japanese colonial
198. Brief for Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Hawai'i v. Trump, (No. 17-15589) (2017).
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ventures in Japan and abroad. U.S. postwar policies in Japan that helped
reconstitute the prewar fascist regime further helped strengthen Japan's
racial superiority in Asia.
As of today, the Japanese government has not officially offered
apologies or reparations to victims of Japan's imperial ventures in Asia that
explicitly acknowledges this history of racism and racial supremacy.
Activists may be able to challenge assumptions about Japanese ideas of
purity, homogeneity, and superiority by promoting new scholarship that
recognizes and documents a discourse on Japanese heterogeneity and
Japanese commonality with their Asian neighbors. Research by Oguma Eiji
persuasively argued that ideas about Japanese having "mixed blood" were
dominant for much of the empire and that ideas about Japanese supremacy
were often rooted in claims that the Japanese represented a culmination and
combination of all Asian peoples and cultures. The idea that the Japanese
were, rather characterized by the purity of their race became dominant as the
war in China intensified. Oguma also maintained that the "myth" that prewar
Japan was dominated by "pure blood" discourse was really a product of
postwar Japanese critiques of fascism that were encouraged by the American
Occupation. In this context, "pure blood" discourse became the foundation
for postwar Japan's "peaceful nature."
Consequently, more research can assist activists in Japan in developing
a more nuanced comparison of "white" and "Japanese" supremacy
ideologies that will help them analyze the distinctiveness of the two contexts
and the important role that Americans played in Japanese postwar
discourses. 199 Activists also can emphasize the role of Japanese researchers,
such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki who documented Japanese military complicity in
the exploitation of military sexual slaves, and Japanese feminists who have
criticized funds given through the Asian Women's Fund as indirect
compensation.20 0 Perhaps the educational component in Japan's 2016 hate
speech law could be used to publicize this research documenting the
atrocities Koreans and other minorities experienced in Japan and in Japanese
colonies during the war. Previous apologies by Chief Cabinet Secretary
Yohei Kono in 1993 and Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 could
be included as well as evidence of sincere but insufficient apologies that need
199. Christy, supra note 59.
200. YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY
DURING WORLD WAR 11 (2002); C. SARAH SOH, THE COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND
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to acknowledge Japanese racism and racial supremacy. 201 Providing
apologies that explicitly recognize Japanese racism and direct individual
compensation for wartime discrimination would give the public more
confidence that the Japanese government's commitment to opposing hate
speech was genuine. While this would not guarantee that the government
would not in the future abuse its power to define hate speech and limit free
speech, it would provide Koreans and other minorities in Japan with a
precedent they could use to remind the public of the suffering caused by
racism and the need to be vigilant about protecting the rights of minorities
and government critics.
201. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study on the
Issue of "Comfort Women, " MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Aug. 4, 1993),
http://www.mofa.go jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html; Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama, On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Aug. 15, 1995), http://www.mofa.go jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/
9508.html.
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